DEEN
AI & Governance

AI agents in banking: operating limits and control

AI agents in financial institutions: limit tasks and permissions, assess approvals and trace actions under MaRisk, DORA and the AI Act.

First version: Updated: Reading time: about 8 minutes

Symbolic image of agentic AI in a bank: connected agent nodes run through a multi-step action chain with checkpoints, a human figure approves an action at a gate, dark background with emerald accents

An AI agent can find information and use it to decide on further actions. Each permitted tool call makes its permissions and controls more consequential. Before deployment, an institution must establish the task, the changes the system may trigger and who assesses its results.

Agents and other forms of automation

AI agents can handle multistep tasks using tools or APIs. Architecture and permissions limit the steps a system may perform itself. The label alone does not establish whether it only gathers information or can also change business transactions.

Maturity model: from RPA to agentic AI
LevelPrincipleTypical in GRCDegree of autonomy
RPADeterministic, rule-based replication of human click and form stepsData transfer, report population, KYC data retrievalnone (rigid, brittle when layouts change)
Intelligent process automationRPA plus ML/OCR/NLP: processes unstructured input, classifies, extractsDocument extraction, alert classification, anomaly detectionlow (model decides sub-steps)
GenAI assistanceLLM generates text or code on request, without acting on its ownPolicy and report drafts, research, summarieslow (a human triggers every step)
Agentic AILLM plans, calls tools and APIs and executes multi-step action chains itselfEnd-to-end control testing, autonomous change monitoring, case handlinghigh (many steps without interim approval)

The level logic is didactic, not an official standard. Real architectures mix the levels: an agent can call RPA building blocks, and a GenAI assistant can be part of an agentic chain.

Legal classification of the use

Whether an agent can be used depends on its task, data access and permitted actions. Search creates different risks from initiating a payment. Approvals should follow the consequences of an action and be technically enforced; the legal duties depend on the actual use. Where an AI model is used for purposes covered by MaRisk AT 4.3.4, the module’s model requirements apply. The assessment depends on its task and use within the institution. Other duties, including DORA and data protection obligations, may apply independently. AI Act consolidated as at 27 July 2026 FSB: Sound practices for responsible adoption of AI, consultation report BaFin: Rundschreiben 06/2026 (BA), MaRisk

On 10 June 2026, the FSB published a consultation report on responsible AI adoption. It discusses accountability and oversight as design issues for financial entities. These recommendations must be distinguished from directly applicable EU and national legal duties. FSB: Sound practices for responsible adoption of AI, consultation report

Human oversight under the AI Act

Article 14 of the AI Act governs human oversight for covered high-risk systems. It does not impose a blanket duty to approve every agent action manually. Other organisational and control duties may apply independently of that classification. AI Act consolidated as at 27 July 2026 Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 amending the AI Act

For covered high-risk systems, oversight measures must be appropriate to risk and autonomy. Responsible people need sufficient information and effective means of intervention. The application date follows the relevant system category. AI Act consolidated as at 27 July 2026

Annex III point 5(b) covers AI systems evaluating the creditworthiness of natural persons or establishing their credit score. Systems used to detect financial fraud are expressly excluded from that category. Classification follows intended purpose and Article 6, rather than the label chatbot or agent. The amendment to the AI Act under Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 has been in force since 27 July 2026. The relevant obligations for Annex III high-risk systems apply from 2 December 2027; those for Annex I high-risk systems apply from 2 August 2028. AI Act consolidated as at 27 July 2026 Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 amending the AI Act European Commission: AI Omnibus enters into force

Potential GRC tasks

The following tasks are possible design areas. Suitability must be established through domain-reviewed results and the system’s permitted actions. Naming a task does not establish a working deployment.

  1. 01Control-test preparation and continuous controls monitoring

    The agent pulls evidence from source systems, checks it against the control's target profile and prepares test documentation. The control judgement stays with the second line.

  2. 02Regulatory change monitoring and horizon scanning

    The agent monitors sources, classifies relevance and drafts gap analyses. Legal interpretation stays with humans.

  3. 03Evidence collection and audit preparation

    The agent compiles evidence, logs and references and keeps track of processing status, so audits start prepared instead of with a search.

  4. 04Alert triage in AML monitoring

    The agent pre-prioritises alerts and enriches them with context. No automatic closing and no reporting without human approval.

  5. 05Report drafting

    The agent drafts report sections from structured sources. Reported figures must never be estimated; every figure needs a traceable origin.

Agentic AI is strong in preparation, research, aggregation and drafting, and risky wherever a regulatorily binding action is triggered: reporting, blocking, rejecting, approving.

Risks of chained actions

An erroneous intermediate step can trigger further actions in a chain. Controls therefore need to account for the consequences of the whole chain. Responsibility and available interventions must be defined before release.

  1. 01Accountability

    Management responsibility follows from Section 25a KWG and MaRisk AT 3.1. Using a technical system does not remove that organisational responsibility.

  2. 02Traceability

    Record inputs, tool calls and results so that a relevant action can be assessed with its context.

  3. 03Error consequences

    Assess which subsequent actions an erroneous intermediate result can trigger and where the chain is stopped.

  4. 04Effective oversight

    Design approvals and monitoring so that responsible people can actually assess the results.

The FSB consultation report

On 10 June 2026, the FSB published a consultation report on responsible AI adoption. It discusses accountability and oversight as design issues for financial entities. These recommendations must be distinguished from directly applicable EU and national legal duties. FSB: Sound practices for responsible adoption of AI, consultation report

The report provides questions for system design: which actions may an agent trigger, and when is intervention required? This assessment can begin with a limited use case. A supervisory publication does not replace assessment of the actual system. FSB: Sound practices for responsible adoption of AI, consultation report

MaRisk and DORA for the particular use

Where an AI model is used for purposes covered by MaRisk AT 4.3.4, the module’s model requirements apply. The assessment depends on its task and use within the institution. Other duties, including DORA and data protection obligations, may apply independently. Management responsibility follows from Section 25a KWG and MaRisk AT 3.1. Using a technical system does not remove that organisational responsibility. BaFin: Rundschreiben 06/2026 (BA), MaRisk

Under DORA, agents are ICT assets. BaFin's guidance of 18 December 2025 makes this concrete in three ways: AI systems belong in an AI inventory, they run through a controlled AI lifecycle from development to decommissioning, and they are subject to ICT third-party risk management. Since agents are usually connected to LLM APIs and cloud services, ICT third-party risk under DORA Chapter V applies on top.

Define controls before release

Control requirements belong in the system’s task specification. The following criteria can support an initial design review. Their implementation is tested against the intended workflows and failure cases.

  1. 01Limit actions

    Define what the system may perform itself at each step and which consequences must be prevented.

  2. 02Assign approvals

    Tie approvals to an action’s consequences and test their technical enforcement.

  3. 03Limit tool permissions

    Expose only the data and APIs required for the task.

  4. 04Trace actions

    Document relevant intermediate steps, results and the system version used.

  5. 05Assign responsibility

    Assign responsibility for deployment and changes; determine legal classification and required validation separately.

FAQ

Frequently asked questions on AI agents in banking

Are German banks allowed to use AI agents?

Whether an agent can be used depends on its task, data access and permitted actions. Search creates different risks from initiating a payment. Approvals should follow the consequences of an action and be technically enforced; the legal duties depend on the actual use.

Does every agent action need human approval?

Article 14 of the AI Act governs human oversight for covered high-risk systems. It does not impose a blanket duty to approve every agent action manually. Other organisational and control duties may apply independently of that classification.

Is an AI agent a model under MaRisk?

Where an AI model is used for purposes covered by MaRisk AT 4.3.4, the module’s model requirements apply. The assessment depends on its task and use within the institution. Other duties, including DORA and data protection obligations, may apply independently.

Who holds organisational responsibility?

Management responsibility follows from Section 25a KWG and MaRisk AT 3.1. Using a technical system does not remove that organisational responsibility.

When does an agent become a high-risk system?

Annex III point 5(b) covers AI systems evaluating the creditworthiness of natural persons or establishing their credit score. Systems used to detect financial fraud are expressly excluded from that category. Classification follows intended purpose and Article 6, rather than the label chatbot or agent.

An offer from T-NEX GmbH

Discuss the project with T-NEX

Start with a limited workflow, explicit action permissions and a testable outcome. A pilot establishes which steps can be automated and where business decisions or escalation remain necessary.

Management: Andreas Unruh and Christoph Gembruch.

Published by T-NEX GmbH.